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Abstract
Bilattice-based triangle provides an elegant algebraic structure for
reasoning with vague and uncertain information. But the truth and
knowledge ordering of intervals in bilattice-based triangle can not han-
dle repetitive belief revisions which is an essential characteristic of non-
monotonic reasoning. Moreover the ordering induced over the intervals
by the bilattice-based triangle is not sometimes intuitive. In this work,
we construct an alternative algebraic structure, namely preorder-based
triangle and we formulate proper logical connectives for this. It is also
demonstrated that Preorder-based triangle serves to be a better al-
ternative to the bilattice-based triangle for reasoning in application
areas, that involve nonmonotonic reasoning and fuzzy reasoning with
uncertain information.
1 Introduction:
In many application domains, decision making and reasoning deal with im-
precise and incomplete information. Fuzzy set theory is a formalism for rep-
resentation of imprecise, linguistic information. A vague concept is described
by a membership function, attributing to all members of a given universe X a
degree of membership from the interval [0,1]. The graded membership value
refers to many-valued propositions in presence of complete information. But
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this ’one-dimensional’ measurement cannot capture the uncertainty present
in information. In absence of complete information the membership degree
may not be assigned precisely. This uncertainty with respect to the assign-
ment of membership degrees is captured by assigning a range of possible
membership values, i.e. by assigning an interval. Interval-valued Fuzzy Sets
(IVFSs) deal with vagueness and uncertainty simultaneously by replacing
the crisp [0,1]-valued membership degree by intervals in [0,1]. The intu-
ition is that the actual membership would be a value within this interval.
The intervals can be ordered with respect to their degree of truth as well
as with respect to their degree of certainty by means of a bilattice-based
algebraic structure, namely Triangle (Arieli, Cornelis, Deschrijver, & Kerre,
2004, 2005; Cornelis, Arieli, Deschrijver, & Kerre, 2007). This algebraic
structure serves as an elegant framework for reasoning with uncertain and
imprecise information.
The truth and knowledge ordering of intervals as induced by the bilattice-
based triangle are inadequate for capturing the repetitive revision and mod-
ification of belief in nonmonotonic reasoning and are not always intuitive.
In this paper we address this issue and attempt to propose an alternate al-
gebraic structure to eliminate the shortcomings of bilattice-based triangle.
The major contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We demonstrate, with the help of proper examples (in section 3), that
bilattice-based triangle is incapable of handling belief revision associated
with nonmonotonic reasoning. In nonmonotonic reasoning, inferences are
modified as more and more information is gathered. The prototypical ex-
ample is inferring a particular individual can fly from the fact that it is a
bird, but retracting that inference when an additional fact is added, that
the individual is a penguin. Such continuous belief revision is not properly
represented in bilattice-based triangle.
• We point that the truth ordering is unintuitive regarding the ordering
of intervals when one interval lies completely within the other (section 3)and
hence not suitable for some practical applications.
• Exploiting the discrepancies mentioned, we propose modifications for
knowledge ordering and truth ordering of intervals so that the aforemen-
tioned shortcomings are removed (in section 4).
• Using the modified knowledge and truth ordering we construct an
alternate algebraic structure, namely preorder-based triangle (in section 5).
This structure can be thought of as a unification of bilattice-based triangle
and default bilattice (Ginsberg, 1988). With this we come out of the realm
of bilattice-based structures and explore a new algebraic structure based on
simple linear pre-ordering.
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• The proposed algebraic structure is then equipped with appropriate
logical operators, i.e. negation, t-norms, t-conorms, implicators, in section
6. Most of the operators are in unison with those used for the bilattice-based
structure. But the modified orderings offer additional flexibility.
• The proposed algebraic structure is shown to be capable of handling
commonsense reasoning problems that could not be handled by the bilattice-
based triangle (in section 7). Moreover, it is demonstrated that the preorder-
based triangle can be employed to construct an answer set programming
paradigm suitable for nonmonotonic reasoning with vague and uncertain
information.
2 Intervals as degree of belief:
This section addresses some of the basic definitions and notions that will
ease the discussion in the forthcoming sections.
Uncertainty and incompleteness of information is unavoidable in real
life reasoning. Hence, sometimes it becomes difficult and misleading, if not
impossible, to assign a precise degree of membership to some fuzzy attribute
or to assert a precise degree of truth to a proposition. Therefore, assigning
an interval of possible truth values is the natural solution. Intervals are
appropriate to describe experts’ degrees of belief, which may not be precise
(Nguyen, Kreinovich, & Zuo, 1997). If an expert chooses a value, say 0.8, as
his degree of belief for a proposition, actually we can only specify vaguely
that his chosen value is around 0.8 and can be represented by an interval,
say [0.75, 0.85]. Otherwise an interval can be thought of as a collection
of possible truth values that a single or multiple rational experts would
assign to a proposition in a scenario. Due to lack of complete knowledge
the assertions made by different experts will be different and this lack of
unanimity can be reflected by appropriate interval. The natural ordering of
degree of memberships (≤) can be extended to the set of intervals and that
gives rise to IVFS (Sambuc, 1975).
An IVFS can be viewed as an L-fuzzy set (Goguen, 1967) and the cor-
responding lattice can be defined as (Deschrijver, Arieli, Cornelis, & Kerre,
2007):
Definition 2.1. LI = (LI ,≤L), where L
I = {[x1, x2]|(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1]
and x1 ≤ x2} and [x1, x2] ≤L [y1, y2] iff x1 ≤ y1 and x2 ≤ y2.
In the definition, LI is the set of all closed subintervals in [0,1].Figure 1
shows the set LI .
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Figure 1: The grey area is LI
Bilattice-based Triangle: Bilattices are ordered sets where elements
are partially ordered with respect to two orderings, typically one depicts
the degree of vagueness or truth (namely, truth ordering) and the other one
depicting the degree of certainty (namely, knowledge ordering) (Arieli et al.,
2004; Cornelis et al., 2007). A bilattice-based triangle, or simply Triangle,
can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. Let L = (L,≤L) be a complete lattice and let I(L) =
{[x1, x2] | (x1, x2) ∈ L
2 and x1 ≤L x2}. A (bilattice-based) triangle is de-
fined as a structure B(L) = (I(L),≤t,≤k), where, for every [x1, x2], [y1, y2]
in I(L):
1. [x1, x2] ≤t [y1, y2] ⇔ x1 ≤L y1 and x2 ≤L y2.
2. [x1, x2] ≤k [y1, y2] ⇔ x1 ≤L y1 and x2 ≥L y2.
This triangle B(L) is not a bilattice, since, though the substructure
(I(L),≤t) is a complete lattice but (I(L),≤k) is a complete semilattice.
When L is the unit interval [0,1], then I(L) describes membership of
IVFS, LI , and the lattice LI becomes (I(L),≤t). In knowledge ordering,
the intervals are ordered by set inclusion, as was suggested by Sandewall
(Sandewall, 1989). The knowledge inherent in an interval [c, d] is greater
than another interval [a, b] if [c, d] ⊆ [a, b].
Triangle B({0, 0.5, 1}) is shown in Figure 2.
3 Inadequacy of Bilattice-based Triangle:
Intervals are used to approximate degree of truth of propositions in absence
of complete knowledge. All values within an interval are considered to be
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Figure 2: Triangle B({0,0.5,1})
equally probable to be the actual truth value of the underlying proposition.
Thus considering intervals as truth status or epistemic state of propositions
enables efficient representation of vagueness and uncertainty of information
and reasoning. However, the Triangle structure suffers from the following
shortcomings that must be eliminated.
3.1 Inadequacy in modeling belief revision in nonmonotonic
reasoning:
One important aspect of human commonsense reasoning is that it is non-
monotonic in nature (Brewka, 1991). In many cases conclusions are drawn in
absence of complete information and we have to draw plausible conclusions
based on the assumption that the world in which the reasoning is performed
is normal and as expected. This is the best that can be done in contexts
where the acquired knowledge is incomplete. But, these conclusions may
have to be given up in light of further information. A proposition that
was assumed to be true, may turn out to be false when new information is
gathered. Such repetitive alterations of believes is an essential part of non-
monotonic reasoning. This type of belief revision may not be adequately
represented by Triangle. The following discussion will illuminate this issue.
3.1.1 An intuitive explanation:
Example 1:Suppose the following information is given:
Rules:
5
Bird(x) −→ Fly(x), [Birds Fly]
Penguin(x) −→ ¬Fly(x), [Penguin doesn’t Fly]
Facts:
Bird (Tweety) [Tweety is a bird]
Given this information, suppose, multiple experts are trying to assess the
degree of truth of the proposition ”Tweety Flies” [Fly (Tweety)]. The rule
”Birds Fly” is not a universally true fact, rather it’s a general assumption
that has several exceptions. Thus, being a Bird is not sufficient to infer that
it will fly, since it may be a Penguin, an ostrich or some other non-flying
bird. Since, nothing is specified about Tweety except for it is a bird, it is
natural in human commonsense reasoning to ”assume” that Tweety is not
an exception and it will fly. Now, the confidence about this ”asumption”
will be different for different experts. An expert may bestow his complete
faith on the fact that Tweety is not an exceptional bird and he will assign
truth value 1 to ”Tweety flies”. Another expert may remain indecisive as
he cannot ignore the chances that Tweety may be a non-flying bird and
he will assign 0.5 (neither true nor false) to the proposition ”Tweety flies”.
Others’ assignments may be at some intermediate level depending on their
perception about the world. Thus, the experts’ truth assignments collec-
tively construct an interval [0.5, 1] as the epistemic state of the rule ”Birds
fly” as well as of the fact ” Fly(Tweety)”.
Now, suppose an additional information is acquired that:
Penguin(Tweety). [Tweety is a penguin]
Then all the experts will unanimously declare Tweety doesn’t fly and
assign an interval [0, 0] as the revised epistemic state of the proposition
”Tweety flies”. The epistemic state of the proposition ” Tweety flies” was
first asserted by an interval [0.5, 1] and later the experts retracted their pre-
viously drawn decision to assert another interval [0, 0]. From intuition it can
be claimed that the interval [0, 0] makes a more confident and precise asser-
tion than [0.5, 1], since in the former case all the experts were unanimous.
But this is not reflected in the bilattice-based triangle (Figure 2); since in
Triangle [0.5, 1] and [0, 0] are incomparable in knowledge ordering. Thus,
given the two intervals, based on the triangle structure, we remain clueless
about which interval has higher degree of knowledge and which interval we
should take up as final assertion of ” Tweety flies”. This is counter-intuitive
and unwanted.
This type of scenario can be efficiently taken care of with the default
bilattice (Ginsberg, 1988). The general rule ”Birds fly” will be assigned ’dt’,
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(a) Default Bilattice (b) Multivalued Default Bilattice
Figure 3: Default bilattices for Nonmonotonic Reasoning
i.e. true by default. Hence, ’Tweety flies’ will also get dt. After acquiring
the knowledge that Tweety is a penguin, ’Tweety flies’ is asserted definitely
false, i.e. f. In the default bilattice (Figure 3.a) f ≥k dt, expressing that the
later conclusion is more certain than the earlier one.
The aforementioned example demonstrates that Triangle is incapable of
depicting the continuous revision of decisions in absence of complete knowl-
edge. Default bilattice is more appropriate than Triangle with respect to
belief revision in nonmonotonic reasoning, but, vagueness or imprecision of
information cannot be represented in Default bilattice.
3.1.2 Example from an application domain:
Bilattice-based structures are put to use for logical reasoning involving hu-
man detection and identity maintenance in visual surveillance systems by
Shet et al. (Shet, 2007; Shet, Neumann, Ramesh, & Davis, 2007; Shet,
Harwood, & Davis, 2006a).
Multi-valued default bilattice (also known as prioritized default bilattice
(Figure 3.b) has been used for identity maintenance and contextual reason-
ing in visual surveillance system (Shet et al., 2006a). However in practice,
logical facts are generated from vision analytics, which rely upon machine
learning and pattern recognition techniques and generally have noisy values.
Thus, in practical applications it would be more realistic to attach arbitrary
amount of beliefs to logical rules rather than values such as dt, df etc that are
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allowed in multivalued default bilattices. For instance, similarity of different
persons based on their appearances is a fuzzy attribute and may attain any
degree over the [0,1] scale. But this cannot be captured by the multivalued
default bilattice.
Bilattice-based square (Arieli et al., 2005) has been used for human de-
tection in visual surveillance system. This algebraic structure is a better
candidate than multivalued default bilattice as it provides continuous de-
grees of belief states.
The difference between bilattice-based square and bilattice-based trian-
gle is that the former allows explicit representation of inconsistent informa-
tion with different degrees of inconsistency. But it is pointed out by Dubois
(Dubois, 2008) that square-like bilattices, where explicit representations of
unknown (〈0, 0〉) and inconsistent (〈1, 1〉) epistemic states are allowed, can
not preserve classical tautologies and sometimes give rise to unintuitive re-
sults.
Hence, bilattice-based triangle seems to be the most dependable and
suitable algebraic structure to be used in the aforementioned applications.
Now let’s apply the bilattice-based triangle to a slightly modified version
of an example demonstrated by Shet et. al. (Shet et al., 2006a; Shet, Har-
wood, & Davis, 2006b) involving logical reasoning in identity maintenance.
Example 2: The example deals with determining whether two individ-
uals observed in an image should be considered as being one and the same.
The rules and facts along with the assigned epistemic states are as follows:
rules:
r1: φ[appear similar(P1, P2) −→ equal(P1, P2)] = [0.5, 1]
r2: φ[distinct(P1, P2) −→ ¬equal(P1, P2)] = [0.9, 1]
facts:
f1: φ[appear similar(a, b)] = [0.8, 0.8]
f2: φ[appear similar(c, d)] = [0.5, 0.5]
f3: φ[distinct(a, b)] = [1, 1]
The specified set of facts depicts that individuals a and b are more sim-
ilar than c and d. Rules r1 and r2 encode the judgments of two different
information sources or different algorithms, none of which present a con-
fident, full-proof answer. However rule r2 (which may be based on some
more accurate and highly reliable information) gives greater assurance to
the non-equality of two persons than the assertion of equality expressed by
rule r1, which may have came from a simple appearance matching technique
of low dependability.
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Intuitively, from the given information, a rational agent would put more
confidence to the fact that individuals a, b are not equal than on their equal-
ity; since the degree of distinction is more than the degree of similarity.The
inference mechanism is specified in (Ginsberg, 1988). The closure operator
over the truth assignment function φ (cl(φ))denotes the truth assignment
that labels information entailed from the given set of rules and facts. The
operator cl+(φ)(q) takes into account set of rules that entail q and cl−(φ)(q)
considers set of rules that entail ¬q. Here the conjunctor, disjunctor and
negator used are min, max and 1− operators respectively.
cl+(φ)(equal(a, b)) = [[0, 1] ∨ ([0.8, 0.8] ∧ [0.5, 1])] = [[0, 1] ∨ [0.5, 0.8]] =
[0.5, 0.8]
cl
−
(φ)(equal(a, b)) = ¬[[0, 1] ∨ ([1, 1] ∧ [0.9, 1])] = ¬[[0, 1] ∨ [0.9, 1]] =
[0, 0.1]
Now the two intervals [0.5, 0.8] and [0, 0.1] are neither comparable with
respect to ≤k in Triangle nor they have a lubk in the Triangle structure.
Thus the two intervals cannot be combined to get a single assertion for
equal(a, b). Hence, using Triangle it is not possible to achieve the intended
inference that a and b don’t seem to be equal.
Thus the knowledge ordering in bilattice-based triangle must be modified
in order to remove the aforementioned discrepancy. The modified knowledge
ordering must incorporate within Triangle the ability to perform reasoning in
presence of nonmonotonicity and demonstrate the repetitive belief revision,
as the default bilattice has.
3.2 Truth ordering is not always accurate:
An interval, taken as an epistemic state for a proposition, specifies the op-
timistic and pessimistic boundaries of the truth value of the proposition. In
the bilattice-based triangle intervals are ordered with respect to ≤t ordering
based on the boundaries of intervals; for two intervals [x1, x2] and [y1, y2],
[x1, x2] ≤t [y1, y2] iff x1 ≤ y1 and x2 ≤ y2. Now with this ordering, any
two intervals x and y are incomparable if x is a proper sub-interval of y
or vice-versa, i.e. if one interval lies completely within the other with no
common boundary. The justification behind this incomparability is that, if
an interval, say y, is a proper sub-interval of x then the actual truth value
approximated by interval x(xˆ) may be greater or less than that of yˆ. For
instance, if x = [0.4, 0.8] and y = [0.6, 0.7] then xˆ can be less than yˆ ( if
xˆ ∈ [0.4, 0.6)) or xˆ can be greater than yˆ (if xˆ ∈ (0.7, 0.8]).
But similar situation may arise even when two intervals are not proper
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sub-interval of one another but just overlap, e.g. say x = [0.4, 0.8] and
y = [0.6, 0.9]. Yet these intervals are t-comparable, i.e., [0.4, 0.8] ≤t [0.6, 0.9].
As the two intervals overlap, it is not ensured that the real truth value
approximated by the lower interval will be smaller than the real truth value
approximated by the higher interval (e.g. though x ≤t y but it may be
the case that xˆ = 0.75 and yˆ = 0.65). In this respect the comparibility
of these two intervals is not justified. Therefore, it is not always the most
accurate ordering and can be regarded as a ” weak truth ordering” (Esteva,
Garcia-Calve´s, & Godo, 1994).
The intuitive justification in support for the truth ordering is given as
(Deschrijver, 2009):
”x ≤t y iff the probability that xˆ ≤ yˆ is larger than xˆ ≥ yˆ” (∗)
i.e. the basic intuition behind truth ordering of two intervals x and y lies in
comparing the probabilities Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) and Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ), where, xˆ and yˆ
are the actual truth values approximated by intervals x and y respectively.
Now, let us check whether this intuition holds good for the aforemen-
tioned pairs of intervals and eliminates the anomaly regarding their com-
paribility. Let us denote the three intervals [0.4, 0.8], [0.6, 0.7] and [0.6, 0.9]
by x, y, z respectively. Now for the pair of intervals x and y, lets calculate
the probabilities as specified in the right hand side of the iff condition in
statement (∗).
Since for an interval [x1, x2] any value α ∈ [x1, x2] is equally probable to
be equal to xˆ (i.e. there is a uniform probability distribution over [x1, x2])
then for a sub-interval [a, b] of [x1, x2] we have, Prob(xˆ ∈ [a, b]) = Prob(xˆ ∈
(a, b]) = Prob(xˆ ∈ [a, b)) = b−a
x2−x1
.
• For intervals x and y, i.e. [0.4, 0.8] and [0.6, 0.7] respectively,
Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ)
= Prob(0.4 ≤ xˆ ≤ 0.6 and 0.6 ≤ yˆ ≤ 0.7) + Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.7])
= Prob(0.4 ≤ xˆ ≤ 0.6).P rob(0.6 ≤ yˆ ≤ 0.7) + Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈
[0.6, 0.7])
= (0.6−0.4)(0.8−0.4) .1 + Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.7])
= 0.5 + Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.7]).
Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ)
= Prob(0.7 ≤ xˆ ≤ 0.8 and 0.6 ≤ yˆ ≤ 0.7) + Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.7])
= Prob(0.7 ≤ xˆ ≤ 0.8).P rob(0.6 ≤ yˆ ≤ 0.7) + Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈
[0.6, 0.7])
= (0.8−0.7)(0.8−0.4) .1 + Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.7])
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= 0.25 + Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.7]).
Now within the overlapped interval [0.6, 0.7], xˆ ≤ yˆ and xˆ ≥ yˆ are equally
probable,i.e.
Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.7]) = Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.7]).
So, Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) > Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ).
• For intervals x and z, i.e. [0.4, 0.8] and [0.6, 0.9] respectively,
Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ)
= Prob(0.4 ≤ xˆ ≤ 0.6 and 0.6 ≤ zˆ ≤ 0.9) + Prob(0.6 ≤ xˆ ≤ 0.8 and
0.8 ≤ zˆ ≤ 0.9) + Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ|xˆ, zˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8])
= Prob(0.4 ≤ xˆ ≤ 0.6).P rob(0.6 ≤ zˆ ≤ 0.9)+Prob(0.6 ≤ xˆ ≤ 0.8).P rob(0.8 ≤
zˆ ≤ 0.9) + Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ|xˆ, zˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8])
= (0.6−0.4)(0.8−0.4) .1 +
(0.8−0.6)
(0.8−0.4) .
(0.9−0.8)
(0.9−0.6) + Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ|xˆ, zˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8])
= 0.5 + 0.167 + Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ|xˆ, zˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8]).
= 0.667 + Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ|xˆ, zˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8]).
Prob(xˆ ≥ zˆ)
= Prob(xˆ ≥ zˆ|xˆ, zˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8])
Again within the overlapped portion [0.6, 0.8], xˆ ≤ zˆ and xˆ ≥ zˆ are
equally probable,i.e.
Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ|xˆ, zˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8]) = Prob(xˆ ≥ zˆ|xˆ, zˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8]).
So, Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ) > Prob(xˆ ≥ zˆ).
Thus it can be seen for pairs of intervals x, y and x, z:
Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) ≥ Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) and
Prob(xˆ ≤ zˆ) ≥ Prob(xˆ ≥ zˆ)
Thus we can see that from the probabilistic perspective the two pairs of
intervals behave similarly but the truth ordering ≤t treats them differently.
Following the intuition of truth ordering, as depicted in statement (∗), both
pairs of intervals should be comparable with respect to ≤t ordering and it
should have been the case that x ≤t y and x ≤t z. However, surprisingly
although we have x ≤t z (since x1 < z1 and x2 < z2) but intervals x and
y are not comparable with respect to the truth ordering ≤t (since x1 < y1
and x2 > y2).
Thus the truth ordering in bilattice-based triangle is not intuitive when it
compares partially or completely overlapped intervals. The incomparability
of intervals x and z with respect to ≤t contradicts with the intuition of
truth ordering(≤t). This may generate unintuitive and problematic results
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in application areas, specially when reasoning is done in absence of complete
knowledge.
Application area where truth ordering fails to perform reason-
ing:
Artificial intelligence based systems are proposed to be used for medical
diagnosis and artificial triage system in emergency wards (Golding, Wilson,
& Marwala, 2008; Burke & Madison, 1990; Wilkes et al., 2010). Use of
possibilistic answer set programming for medical diagnosis has been reported
in (Bauters, Schockaert, De Cock, & Vermeir, 2014).
Possibilistic approach is suitable for capturing the uncertainty present
in information. For instance, in the framework we can represent and reason
with the possibility of a particular disease, given a set of symptoms. But
sometimes the severity level of the particular disease,i.e. whether it is in
primary stage or advanced stage, is also essential to know. For instance, only
knowing a patient has coronary blockage is not sufficient, but whether there
is any risk of heart attack or what type of surgery is to be done is dependent
on the percentage of blockage of the coronary artery. Again if a patient comes
in an emergency ward with stomach ache then the triage nurse would assess
the urgency depending on the degree of pain the patient is experiencing.
Sometimes the patient is asked to rate his/her pain on a scale of 1 to 10.
These are not uncertain quantities but fuzzy quantities. Therefore the truth
value of the statement ”Patient A is suffering from disease X” would not be
bivalent rather would have to be chosen from a continuous range of values
from [0, 1]. This information can not be represented in the Possibilistic ASP,
which is essentially based on two valued logic.
In practice, several factors contribute to the severity of a particular ail-
ment. Therefore sometimes it becomes difficult to diagnose a disease with
a specific severity degree; rather it is more natural to ascribe a range of
values.This may be due to the presence of subjective uncertainties, e.g.
fluctuating blood pressure or body temperature or nonspecific rating of a
patient’s pain. Another reason may be incomplete knowledge, based on
which decisions are being taken. For example, in an emergency situation
medical decisions have to be taken rapidly when the doctors can’t wait for
all the test results and must make their decisions based on assumptions,
rules of thumb and experience. Again, multiple agents (in this case doctors
in medical board or different triage nurses) may not be unanimous about
a judgment. Thus, the epistemic state of a statement like ’Patient A has
disease d1’ would be comprised of an subinterval in [0, 1], where each in-
dividual value in the interval represent an expert’s opinion regarding how
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true the statement is. The epistemic state of the statement ’Patient A has
disease d1’ is same as the suspected severity degree of the disease. When
the experts have complete knowledge and there isn’t any uncertainty, they
provide unanimous opinion depicted by an exact interval of the form [x, x],
where the value x would signify the severity of the disease. More is the
uncertainty wider would be the assigned interval. For example, the pain
rated by a patient by the range 5 − 7 on a scale of 0 − 10, can be repre-
sented by the interval [0.5, 0.7]. Therefore when a system is built to perform
reasoning with these types of information subintervals of [0, 1] are assigned
to simple propositions as their epistemic states denoting the vagueness and
uncertainty. For example, the pain rated by a patient by the range 5 − 7
on a scale of 0− 10, can be represented by the interval [0.5, 0.7]. Decisions
regarding the prescribed treatment would be based on the epistemic states
and comparing them.
Bilattice-based triangle structure can be used to reason with such vague
and uncertain information. The two natural orderings in bilattice-based
triangle, namely knowledge ordering and truth ordering, can be employed to
compare respectively certainty and vagueness about different propositions,
e.g. severity degree of ailments. In medical decisions the truth ordering may
play a more crucial role.
Example 3. Suppose an intelligent triage system has diagnosed a pa-
tient with two diseases (say di1 and di2). There may be situations where
the doctor has to prioritize the treatment of the two diseases based on their
severity. This situation may arise when medications for two diseases are mu-
tually incompatible or both of them require surgery that can not be done
simultaneously. Thus deciding which treatment is more urgent becomes
crucial.
Suppose the artificial triage system has the following rules in its system
regarding the two diseases di1 and di2 and its medications (dr1 and dr2):
1. φ[di1, not dr2 −→ dr1] = [1, 1],
2. φ[di2, not dr1 −→ dr2] = [1, 1],
These rules denote the mutual incompatibility of drugs for the two dis-
eases. They suggest that if a patient is diagnosed with disease 1(2) and drug
2(1) is not being administered then drug 1(2) can be given to the patient.
Hence when a patient is diagnosed with both of these diseases the triage
system must calculate which of the two diseases is more severe and requires
urgent medication. Based on the symptoms the severity of the diseases are
specified by the intervals id1 and id2 respectively. If the assigned epistemic
states, that denotes the level of severity, are exact intervals then simply
comparing the assigned value would be enough. But when id1 and id2 are
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non-exact intervals then it must be decided which among the knowledge
ordering and truth ordering has to be used for comparing the intervals to
compare the severity. An example can help to clarify the intuition. Suppose,
the intervals id1 and id2 are respectively [0.5, 0.6] and [0.6, 0.9]. Here, as a
whole di2 is suspected to be in a more severe condition than di1, because for
each value a ∈ id2, a is greater than the upper limit of id1. Hence though the
uncertainty regarding di2 is more (since the interval id2 is wider than that
of id1), but the chance that di2 is more critical is higher than that of di1
and di2 is to be treated before di1. The truth ordering in the bilattice-based
triangle is supposed to capture this intuition and indeed in this case we have
id2 ≤t id1 (since, [0.5, 0.6] ≤t [0.6, 0.9]). Thus the triage system must have
the following rules to prioritize the treatment considering the urgency or
severity of the diseases:
3. φ[(φ[di2] ≤t φ[di1]) −→ dr1] = [1, 1]
4. φ[(φ[di1] ≤t φ[di2]) −→ dr2] = [1, 1]
Now suppose. based on the symptoms and test results (which may not
be complete) the severity of each disease are asserted and fed into the triage
system’s database as follows:
5. φ[di1] = [0.4, 0.9]
6. φ[di2] = [0.5, 0.6]
Now, considering the input information the triage system would have to
decide which of the drugs among dr1 and dr2 have to be administered based
on the severity.
But now suppose id1 and id2 are respectively [0.4, 0.9] and [0.5, 0.6].
These two intervals cannot be compared with respect to ≤t. Therefore,
in this situation, the artificial triage system cannot decide which disease is
to be treated first. But this is not intuitive, since, following the similar
analysis as demonstrated in the previous subsection it can be proved that
it is more probable that the actual severity of di1 (as approximated by the
interval [0.4, 0.9]) is higher than that of di2 (as approximated by interval
[0.5, 0.6]). Thus, treatment of di1 is more urgent and hence dr1 must be
administered first.
The bilattice-based triangle is incapable of capturing this notion. Thus
the truth ordering in bilattice-based triangle must be modified so that the
new ordering behaves as ≤t when intervals are non-overlapping and cap-
tures the probabilistic essence stated in statement (∗) when intervals are
overlapping.
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Figure 4: I({0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1}) with modified knowledge ordering
4 Modification in Triangle structure:
Based on the discussions in the above two subsections the bilattice-based
triangle is modified.
4.1 Modification in knowledge ordering:
The knowledge ordering can be defined based on just the length of intervals
and irrespective of the real truth values they attempt to approximate. Thus
for two intervals [x1, x2] and [y1, y2] ∈ L
I , where, LI is the set of sub-intervals
of [0, 1] as shown in Figure 1
[x1, x2] ≤kp [y1, y2]⇔ (x2 − x1) ≥ (y2 − y1).
that is, wider the interval lesser is the knowledge content. Equality
of the width of intervals is a necessary condition for x = y, but not a
sufficient condition; because two different intervals may have equal width,
e.g. [0.1, 0.2] and [0.7, 0.8].
The algebraic structure for (I({0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}),≤t ,≤kp) is shown in
Fig. 4.
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Figure 5: y is a proper sub-interval of x
4.2 Modification in Truth Ordering:
The truth ordering (≤t) gives rise to certain discrepancies in ordering inter-
vals, as discussed in section 3.2. Lets take statement (∗) as a starting point
to revisit the truth ordering, especially in case when one interval is a proper
sub-interval of the other. In this respect the following theorem is stipulated.
Theorem 4.1. For two intervals x = [x1, x2] and y = [y1, y2] ∈ L
I ,
Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) ≤ Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) ≡ xm ≤ ym
where, xˆ(yˆ) stands for the actual truth value approximated by the interval
x(y); and xm and ym are respectively the midpoints of intervals x and y.
Proof. The proof is constructed by considering several cases depending on
how intervals x and y are situated on the [0, 1] scale. Without loss of gen-
erality it is assumed that x1 ≤ y1 for showing the proof. For the other case,
i.e. x1 > y1 similar proof can be constructed which is not shown here.
Since any x ∈ [x1, x2] is equally probable to be equal to xˆ (i.e. there is
a uniform probability distribution over [x1, x2]) then for a sub-interval [a, b]
of [x1, x2] we have, Prob(xˆ ∈ [a, b]) = Prob(xˆ ∈ (a, b]) = Prob(xˆ ∈ [a, b)) =
b−a
x2−x1
.
Case 1:
Suppose, x = [x1, x2] has y = [y1, y2] as a proper sub-interval (Figure 5).
For these intervals x1 < y1 and y2 < x2, hence x and y can not be ordered
using ≤t.
In this case,
1. xˆ ≤ yˆ iff xˆ ∈ [x1, y1) or (xˆ ≤ yˆ given xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, y2]),
2. xˆ ≥ yˆ iff xˆ ∈ (y2, x2] or (xˆ ≥ yˆ given xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, y2]).
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Figure 6: x and y are overlapping
Within the smaller interval [y1, y2] the xˆ ≤ yˆ and xˆ ≥ yˆ are equally
probable,i.e.
Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, y2]) = Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, y2]).
Now,
Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) ≤ Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ)
≡ Prob(xˆ ∈ (y2, x2] or (xˆ ≥ yˆ given xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, y2])) ≤ Prob(xˆ ∈ [x1, y1)
or (xˆ ≤ yˆ given xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, y2]))
≡ Prob(xˆ ∈ (y2, x2]) +Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, y2]) ≤ Prob(xˆ ∈ [x1, y1)) +
Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, y2])
≡ Prob(xˆ ∈ (y2, x2]) ≤ Prob(xˆ ∈ [x1, y1))
≡ x2−y2
x2−x1
≤ y1−x1
x2−x1
≡ (x2 − y2) ≤ (y1 − x1) (since (x2 − x1) > 0)
≡ (x1 + x2) ≤ (y1 + y2)
≡ x1+x22 ≤
y1+y2
2
≡ the midpoint of interval x ≤ the midpoint of interval y
≡ xm ≤ ym.
Case 2:
Suppose two intervals x = [x1, x2] and y = [y1, y2] are overlapping, as
shown in Figure 6. In this case, x1 ≤ y1 and x2 ≤ y2.
Here,
1. xˆ ≤ yˆ iff xˆ ∈ [x1, y1) or (xˆ ∈ [y1, x2] and yˆ ∈ (x2, y2]) or (xˆ ≤ yˆ given
xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, x2]),
2. xˆ ≥ yˆ iff (xˆ ≥ yˆ given xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, x2]).
Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) ≤ Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ)
≡ Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, x2]) ≤ Prob(xˆ ∈ [x1, y1)) + Prob(xˆ ∈ [y1, x2]
and yˆ ∈ (x2, y2]) + Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, x2])
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Figure 7: x and y are disjoint and x ≤t y
≡ Prob(xˆ) ∈ [x1, y1) + Prob(xˆ ∈ [y1, x2] and yˆ ∈ (x2, y2]) ≥ 0
(since, Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, x2]) = Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ|xˆ, yˆ ∈ [y1, x2]))
≡ y1−x1
x2−x1
+ x2−y1
x2−x1
y2−x2
y2−y1
≥ 0
≡ (y1 − x1)(y2 − y1) + (y2 − x2)(x2 − y1) ≥ 0
≡ y1y2 − x1y2 − y
2
1 + x1y1 + x2y2 − x
2
2 − y1y2 + x2y1 ≥ 0
≡ x1y1 + x2y2 + x2y1 − x1y2 − y
2
1 − x
2
2 ≥ 0
(cancelling y1y2 and −y1y2 and rearranging terms)
≡ x2(y2 + y1 − x2)− y1(y1 − x1)− x1y2 ≥ 0
≡ x2(y2 + y1 − x2)− y1(y1 − x1)− x1x2 ≥ 0
(since x2 ≤ y2)
≡ x2(y2 + y1 − x1 − x2)− y1(y1 − x1) ≥ 0
≡ x2(y2 + y1 − x1 − x2) ≥ 0
(since x1 ≤ y1)
≡ (y2 + y1 − x1 − x2) ≥ 0
≡ (y1 + y2) ≥ (x1 + x2)
≡ y1+y22 ≥
x1+x2
2
≡ the midpoint of interval y ≥ the midpoint of interval x
≡ xm ≤ ym.
Case 3:
We can have two subcases for disjoint intervals (Figure 7). For subcase
a, the interval x is lower than the interval y, i.e. ∀a ∈ [x1, x2], a ≤ y1 or
in other words x1 < x2 ≤ y1 < y2. Similarly, for subcase b, the interval
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y is lower than the interval x, i.e. ∀b ∈ [y1, y2], b ≤ x1 or in other words
y1 < y2 ≤ x1 < x2.
In this case, since intervals are disjoint,
Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) = 1 and Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) = 0 if x2 ≤ y1 (Subcase a);
Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) = 0 and Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) = 1 if y2 ≤ x1 (Subcase b);
Now,
Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) < Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ)
⇒ Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) = 0 and Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) = 1
⇒ ∀a ∈ [x1, x2], a ≤ y1
⇒ x2 ≤ y1
⇒ x1 + x2 ≤ y1 + x1
⇒ x1 + x2 < y1 + y2 [since, x1 < y1]
⇒ xm < ym.
Again;
xm < ym
⇒ x1 + x2 < y1 + y2
⇒ x1 < y1 and x2 < y2 and x2 ≤ y1 [since intervals are disjoint]
⇒ Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) = 0 and Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) = 1
⇒ Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) < Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ).
Thus Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) < Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) ≡ xm < ym.
Here the proof ends.
Hence, it is proved that the straightforward way to compare the proba-
bilities Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) and Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ) for two intervals x and y is to compare
their midpoints. Case 1 in the above proof is particularly interesting, where
one interval is a proper sub-interval of the other. Though the chosen inter-
vals x and y are not comparable with respect to ≤t ordering, but we can
compare their midpoints and thus order the probabilities Prob(xˆ ≥ yˆ) and
Prob(xˆ ≤ yˆ). Thus following statement (∗) a truth ordering can be imposed
on x and y based on the probabilistic comparison. The existing truth or-
dering (≤t) as shown in Definition 2.2, doesn’t allow this comparability of
x and y, and hence a new truth ordering is called for.
Now that we are able to estimate and order the probabilities, in light
of statement (∗) we are in a place to construct a generalised truth ordering
(≤tp) as follows:
x ≤tp y ⇔ xm ≤ ym.
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Figure 8: Intervals incomparable in t-ordering but not equal
The equality of midpoints of two intervals x and y, (i.e. x1+x22 =
y1+y2
2 )
is a necessary condition for x = y, but not a sufficient condition; because
two different intervals can have same midpoint, as shown in Figure 8.
Moreover, the discrepancy mentioned in section 3.2 is resolved, since
cases where intervals are overlapped and when one interval is a proper sub-
interval of the other are treated uniformly and in each case intervals are
comparable with respect to ≤tp .
Theorem 4.2. For two intervals x = [x1, x2] and y = [y1, y2] ∈ L
I , such
that none is a proper subinterval of the other,
x ≤t y ⇒ x ≤tp y.
Proof. From the definition,
x ≤t y ⇔ x1 ≤ x2 and y1 ≤ y2
⇒ x1 + x2 ≤ y1 + y2
⇒ xm ≤ ym
⇒ x ≤tp y.
Thus, the probabilistic analysis gives a broader truth ordering of the
intervals that can be achieved by comparing midpoints of intervals. For
each pair of intervals if they are comparable with respect to ≤t they are also
comparable with respect to the modified truth ordering ≤tp and additionally
≤tp can order intervals when one of them is a proper sub-interval of the other
and hence are not ≤t −comparable.
For instance, for two intervals x = [0, 1] and y = [0.8, 0.9] we have
[0, 1] <tp [0.8, 0.9] though x and y are not t-comparable w.r.t. ≤t.
The algebraic structure for (I({0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}),≤tp ,≤k) is shown in
Figure 9.
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Figure 9: I({0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1}) with modified truth ordering
5 An alternative algebraic structure
Based on these modifications we propose a modified and more intuitive
algebraic structure for ordering intervals with respect to degree of truth
and knowledge (or certainty).
Notation: For an interval x ∈ LI ; xm and xw will be used to denote
the midpoint (or center) and the length of the interval respectively; i.e.
xm = (x1 + x2)/2 and xw = (x2 − x1). The pair (xm, xw) uniquely specifies
an interval x and hence may be used instead of the traditional representation
[x1, x2].
Definition 5.1. A preorder-based triangle is a structure P(L) = (LI ,≤tp
,≤kp), defined for every [x1, x2] and [y1, y2] ∈ L
I as:
1. [x1, x2] ≤tp [y1, y2]⇔ xm ≤ ym,
2. [x1, x2] ≤kp [y1, y2]⇔ xw ≥ yw,
3. x = y ⇔ xm = ym and xw = yw.
Preorder-based triangle can be defined for any subset of LI as well. For
instance preorder-based triangle for I({0, 0.5, 1}) and for I({0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1})
are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively. The dashed lines demon-
strate the connections that were absent in the bilattice-based triangle.
With the truth and knowledge ordering presented in Definition 5.1 we
step out of the realm of lattice-based structures. The substructure (LI ,≤tp)
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Figure 10: Modified Triangle for I({0,0.5,1})
Figure 11: Modified Triangle for I({0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1})
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is not a lattice since for any two intervals a and b, existence of lubtp(a, b)
and glbtp(a, b) are not guaranteed. For instance, suppose L = {0, 0.1, 0.2.., 1}
i.e. the unit interval discretised with eleven equidistant points. Now, two
intervals in I(L), [0.8, 0.8] and [0.6, 1] are incomparable with respect to ≤tp .
The upper bound of the two intervals is not a unique element, but a set of
intervals {[0.7, 1], [0.8, 0.9]}. Hence lubtp doesn’t exist. Lower bound of the
two intervals is the set {[0.7, 0.8], [0.6, 0.9], [0.5, 1]}.
The ordering ≤tp and ≤kp over the set of intervals are not lattice-orders
but pre-orders, i.e reflexive and transitive. The orderings are not sym-
metric clearly. Nor they are anti-symmetric, since [0.5, 0.5] ≤tp [0, 1] and
[0, 1] ≤tp [0.5, 0.5] but [0.5, 0.5] 6= [0, 1] and similar example holds for the
k-ordering. Thus the substructure (LI ,≤tp) and (L
I ,≤kp) form pre-ordered
sets instead of lattices. Moreover, in (LI ,≤kp) any set of intervals have lower
bound but may not have upper bound. For instance, following the earlier
example, intervals [0.5, 0.5] and [0.8, 0.8] doesn’t have an upper bound, but
has the set of intervals of length 0.1 as its lower bound.
Because of the modified knowledge ordering, the preorder-based triangle
can be thought of as a unification of the default bilattice and the bilattice-
based triangle.
One point must be emphasized here is that, bilattice-based triangle is
a more generalised algebraic structure that can be defined for any set of
intervals over any complete lattice. However, preorder-based triangle can
only be defined over subintervals of [0, 1] (or any interval of real numbers),
because intervals in general complete lattices may not have midpoints or
lengths.
Definition 5.2. A set of intervals in LI is said to be an m-set for a specific
value a ∈ [0, 1] and is defined as:
m− seta = {x|x ∈ L
I and xm = a}.
i.e. the set of intervals incomparable with the interval [a, a] with respect
to their degree of truth.
6 Logical Operators on P(L)
All the logical operators, e.g. conjunction, disjunction, implication and
negation, defined for bilattice-based triangle (B(L)) (Cornelis et al., 2007;
Deschrijver et al., 2007) are applicable for preorder-based triangle (P(L))
as well. But the modified truth and knowledge ordering will incorporate
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some modifications in the definition and properties of the connectives. The
notations 0LI and 1LI stand for intervals [0, 0] and [1, 1] respectively.
6.1 Negator:
Definition 6.1. A negator on (LI ,≤tp) is a decreasing mapping N : L
I −→
LI , for which N(0LI ) = 1LI and N(1LI ) = 0LI . If N(N(x)) = x, then N is
involutive.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose there exists an involutive negator N on ([0, 1],≤).
Then for all x = [x1, x2] in L
I the mapping N : LI −→ LI defined as
N(x) = [N(x2), N(x1)]
is an involutive negator on (LI ,≤tp)
Proof. N to be an involutive negator it must satisfy the following criteria:
1.Boundary Condition:
N being an involutive negator on ([0, 1],≤), N(0) = 1 and N(1) = 0.
Therefore,
N(0LI ) = N([0, 0]) = [N(0), N(0)] = [1, 1] = 1LI .
N(1LI ) = N([1, 1]) = [N(1), N(1)] = [0, 0] = 0LI .
2.N has to be decreasing on (LI ,≤tp).
Let x = [x1, x2] and y = [y1, y2] are two intervals in L
I .
Now suppose, without loss of generality, x ≥tp y; which implies,
x1+x2
2 ≥
y1+y2
2 or, x1 + x2 ≥ y1 + y2.
Case 1: If neither of x and y is a sub-interval of the other, i.e.
x1 ≥ y1 and x2 ≥ y2.
Hence, N(x1) ≤ N(y1) and N(x2) ≤ N(y2); since N is decreasing.
Therefore, N(x1) +N(x2) ≤ N(y1) +N(y2),
or, N(x1)+N(x2)2 ≤
N(y1)+N(y2)
2 ,
or, N(x) ≤tp N(y).
Hence, N is decreasing.
Case 2: When y is a sub-interval of x. Thus,
x1 ≤ y1 and y2 ≤ x2
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Hence, N(x1) ≥ N(y1) and N(y2) ≥ N(x2).
Since, x ≥tp y, x1 + x2 ≥ y1 + y2.
or, x2 − y2 ≥ y1 − x1.
Therefore, N(y2)−N(x2) ≥ N(x1)−N(y1); since N is decreasing.
or, N(y2) +N(y1) ≥ N(x1) +N(x2).
or, N(y) ≥tp N(x).
Thus, N is decreasing.
Case 3: When x is a sub-interval of y. Then;
x1 ≥ y1 and y2 ≥ x2
Hence, N(x1) ≤ N(y1) and N(y2) ≤ N(x2).
Since, x ≥tp y, x1 + x2 ≥ y1 + y2.
or, x1 − y1 ≥ y2 − x2.
Therefore, N(y1)−N(x1) ≥ N(x2)−N(y2); since N is decreasing.
or, N(y1) +N(y2) ≥ N(x1) +N(x2).
or, N(y) ≥tp N(x).
Thus, N is decreasing.
Therefore, it is proved that N satisfies the boundary conditions and is a
decreasing mapping on (LI ,≤tp). So N is a negator on (L
I ,≤tp).
Since, N is involutive, we obtain that, ∀x ∈ [0, 1];
N(N(x)) = N([N(x2), N(x1)])
= [N(N(x1)), N(N(x2))] = [x1, x2] = x.
Hence, N is involutive.
A standard negator
For an element x = [x1, x2] in L
I the standard negation of x is defined
as:
Definition 6.3. Ns(x) = [1− x2, 1− x1].
Thus the degree of knowledge is unaltered by negation, but the interval
(and hence its midpoint) is reflected across the central line of LI i.e. the
line joining points [0.5, 0.5] and [0, 1]. This negation corresponds to classical
negation.
Properties:
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1. Ns(0LI ) = 1LI .
2. Ns is decreasing.
3. Ns is continuous.
4. Ns is involutive; i.e. Ns(Ns(x)) = x.
One point that must be emphasized is that involutive negators can be
defined on (LI ,≤tp) that are not of the form stated in Theorem 6.2.
Example: Consider the lattice L = ({0, 1/3, 2/3, 1},≤) and a mapping
N1 on (I(L),≤tp) defined as follows:
N1([x1, x2]) = [1/3, 2/3] if [x1, x2] is [0, 1]
= [0, 1] if [x1, x2] is [1/3, 2/3]
= [1− x2, 1− x1] otherwise.
N1 is an involutive negator on (I(L),≤tp), but is not of the form specified
in Theorem 6.2. This is the difference between negators on bilattice-based
triangle (Cornelis et al., 2007) and preorder-based triangles.
6.2 T-norms and T-conorms:
The t-norms and t-conorms can be defined over the preorder-based triangle.
Definition 6.4. A conjunctor on (LI ,≤tp) is an increasing L
I × LI → LI
mapping T satisfying T(0LI , 0LI ) =T(0LI , 1LI ) = T(1LI , 0LI ) = 0LI and
T(1LI , 1LI ) = 1LI .
A conjunctor is called a semi-norm if (∀x ∈ LI)(T(1LI , x) =T(x, 1LI ) =
x) and a semi-norm is called a t-norm if it is commutative and associative.
Definition 6.5. A disjunctor on (LI ,≤tp) is an increasing L
I × LI → LI
mapping S satisfying S(1LI , 0LI ) =S(0LI , 1LI ) = S(1LI , 1LI ) = 1LI and
S(0LI , 0LI ) = 0LI .
A disjunctor is called a semi-conorm if (∀x ∈ LI)(S(0LI , x) =S(x, 0LI ) =
x) and a semi-conorm is called a t-conorm if it is commutative and associa-
tive.
Two important class of t-(co)norms defined for IVFS, namely t-representable
and pseudo t-representable t-(co)norms (Deschrijver, 2008), can be defined
over the preorder-based triangle structure.
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Definition 6.6. A t-norm T on (LI ,≤tp) is called t-representable if there
exist t-norms T1 and T2 on ([0, 1],≤) such that T1 ≤ T2 and such that T
can be represented as, for all x, y ∈ LI :
T(x, y) = [T1(x1, y1), T2(x2, y2)].
T1 and T2 are called representants of T.
Definition 6.7. A t-norm T on (LI ,≤tp) is called pseudo t-representable
if there exists an t-norms T on ([0, 1],≤) such that for all x, y ∈ I(L):
T(x, y) = [T (x1, y1),max(T (x1, y2), T (x2, y1)].
T is called the representant of T.
6.2.1 Min t-norm and t-conorm
The Min t-norm (TMin) is the greatest t-norm with respect to the ≤t or-
dering and is defined as:
TMin = [min(x1, y1),min(x2, y2)].
One property of this t-norm is that it doesn’t hold that ∀x, y ∈ LI either
TMin(x, y) = x or TMin(x, y) = y; for instance, TMin([0.1, 0.5], [0.2, 0.3]) =
[0.1, 0.3]. This phenomenon is not intuitive sometimes. Using the modified
truth ordering (≤tp) a variant of the min t-norm can be defined over (L
I ,≤tp)
as follows:
Definition 6.8. For any two intervals x, y ∈ LI
TMinp(x, y) = mint{x, y} if xm 6= ym
= maxk{x, y} if xm = ym
Definition 6.9. For any two intervals x, y ∈ LI
SMinp(x, y) = maxt{x, y} if xm 6= ym
= maxk{x, y} if xm = ym
In the above definition mint{x, y} gives the interval having lower degree
of truth irrespective of its knowledge content, i.e. mint{x, y} = x if x ≤tp y.
Similar meaning can be ascribed to maxt{x, y}. Whereas, mink{x, y} gives
the interval which is lower with respect to the k-ordering, i.e. having higher
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degree of uncertainty. For instance, mink{x, y} = x if x ≤kp y. Similarly
maxk{x, y} can be defined.
It is clear that TMinp and SMinp satisfies the conditions in Definition 6.4
and 6.5 respectively.
Example: TMinp([0.1, 0.5], [0.2, 0.3]) = [0.2, 0.3]. Thus, for all x, y ∈ L
I
either TMinp(x, y) = x or TMinp(x, y) = y.
Theorem 6.10. The t-norm TMinp, t-conorm SMinp and negator Ns forms
a De-Morgan triplet, i.e.
1. TMinp(x, y) = Ns(SMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y))),
2. SMinp(x, y) = Ns(TMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y))).
Proof. Consider two intervals x, y ∈ LI .
Part 1: First, suppose intervals x and y are comparable with respect to
≤tp , and lets assume, without loss of generality x ≥tp y. Thus TMinp(x, y) =
y and SMinp(x, y) = x. Since Ns is decreasing with respect to the degree
of truth, then Ns(x) ≤tp Ns(y). So, from definition SMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y)) =
Ns(y). Thus Ns(SMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y))) = y = TMinp(x, y).
Moreover, if xm = ym (i.e. x and y are incomparable with respect to
their degree of truth), and say, x ≤kp y TMinp(x, y) = y. Since the negator
Ns preserves the degree of knowledge and reverses the degree of truth,Ns(x)
andNs(y) are incomparable in t-ordering andNs(x) ≤kp Ns(y). Thus, from
definition SMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y)) = Ns(y) and Ns(SMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y))) =
y = TMinp(x, y).
Part 2: If x ≤tp y, then Ns(x) ≥tp Ns(y) and TMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y)) =
Ns(y). Thus Ns(TMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y))) = y = SMinp(x, y).
Moreover, if xm = ym and say, x ≤kp y SMinp(x, y) = y. The negator
Ns being order preserving for k-ordering, Ns(x) ≤kp Ns(y). Thus, from
definition TMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y)) = Ns(y) and Ns(TMinp(Ns(x),Ns(y))) =
y = SMinp(x, y).
Hence, the t-norm TMinp , t-conorm SMinp and negator Ns forms a De-
Morgan triplet.
6.2.2 Product t-norm and t-conorm
The product t-(co)norm is useful to model the conjunction of indepen-
dent events in probabilistic semantics. The t-representable and pseudo t-
representable proudct t-(co)norms on (LI ,≤tp) are defined in the same way
as defined on (LI ,≤t).
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Definition 6.11. For any two intervals x, y ∈ LI , the product t-norm is
defined as follows:
Tpr([x1, x2], [y1, y2]) = [x1y1, x2y2], (t-representable)
Tppr([x1, x2], [y1, y2]) = [x1y1,max(x1y2, x2y1)], (pseudo t-representable)
Theorem 6.12. For any x, y ∈ LI
Tpr ≥tp Tppr
The proof of the above theorem is straightforward.
Definition 6.13. The t-representable t-conorm can be defined as:
Spr([x1, x2], [y1, y2]) = [1− (1− x1)× (1− y1), 1 − (1− x2)× (1− y2)]
Theorem 6.14. The t-norm Tpr, t-conorm Spr and the standard negator
Ns forms a De-Morgan triplet, i.e.
1. Tpr(x, y) = Ns(Spr(Ns(x),Ns(y))),
2. Spr(x, y) = Ns(Tpr(Ns(x),Ns(y))),
Proof. Consider any two intervals [x1, x2], [y1, y2] ∈ L
I .
1.Spr(Ns(x),Ns(y))
= Spr([1− x2, 1− x1], [1− y2, 1− y1])
= [1− x2 × y2, 1− x1 × y1].
Now, Ns(Spr(Ns(x),Ns(y))) = Ns([1 − x2 × y2, 1 − x1 × y1]) = [x1 ×
y1, x2 × y2] = Tpr([x1, x2], [y1, y2])
2. Tpr(Ns(x),Ns(y))
= Tpr([1− x2, 1− x1], [1− y2, 1− y1])
= [(1 − x2)× (1− y2), (1 − x1)× (1− y1)].
Now, Ns(Tpr(Ns(x),Ns(y)))
= Ns((1− x2)× (1− y2), (1 − x1)× (1− y1))
= [1− (1− x1)× (1− y1), 1− (1− x2)× (1− y2)]
= Spr([x1, x2], [y1, y2]); (from definition).
The t-norm Tpr, t-conorm Spr and the standard negator Ns forms a De-
Morgan triplet.
Thus, the preorder-based triangle structure offers us the flexibility to
choose t-norms and t-conorms already defined for bilattice-based triangle or
to define new connectives in accordance to the newly defined t-ordering and
k-ordering.
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6.3 Implicators:
Definition 6.15. An implicator on (LI ,≤tp) is a hybrid monotonous L
I ×
LI → LI mapping I(i.e. a mapping with decreasing first and increasing
second partial mapping) that satisfies I(0LI , 0LI ) = I(0LI , 1LI ) = I(1LI , 1LI )
= 1LI and I(1LI , 0LI ) = 0LI .
One of the common class of implicators are Strong-implicators or S-
implicators in short.
Definition 6.16. For two intervals x, y ∈ LI and any t-conorm S and
negator N on (LI ,≤t) the S-implicator generated by S and N is
IS,N (x, y) = S(N(x), y).
The S-implicators defined for the structure (LI ,≤tp) are similar to those
defined for (LI ,≤t), and are not discussed further.
There is another important class of implicators, namely R-implicators,
generated as residuum of some t-norms on (LI ,≤t). An R-implicator on
(LI ,≤t) generated by a t-norm T is defined as:
IR(x, y) = Sup{γ ∈ L
I |T(x, γ) ≤t y}.
Now, because the definition involves truth ordering, the modified definition
of ≤tp demands modification to the definition of R-implicator.
Definition 6.17. For a t-norm T defined on (LI ,≤tp) an R-implicator gen-
erated from T is defined as:
IRtp (x, y) = Suptp{γ ∈ L
I |T(x, γ) ≤tp y or [T(x, γ)]m = ym}
where, Suptp is the interval having maximum degree of truth. Some-
times, instead of a unique value, the operation Suptp may give a set of inter-
vals belonging to the same m-set and hence IRtp (x, y) may not be unique.
Example: Suppose L = ([0, 1],≤) and the t-norm is TMinp . Then the
R-implicator generated from this t-norm is given by:
IMin = Suptp{γ ∈ L
I |TMinp(x, γ) ≤tp y or [TMinp(x, γ)]m = ym}.
1. If x ≤tp y, for any γ ∈ L
I , TMinp(x, γ) ≤tp y. Thus, IMin = [1, 1].
2. If xm = ym, then for any γ ≥tp x, [TMinp(x, γ)]m = ym. Thus,
IMin = [1, 1].
3. If x ≥tp y, then for any interval γ with γm = ym, we have [TMinp(x, γ)]m =
ym. Thus, IMin = γ s.t. γm = ym. Hence, the implicator does not give a
unique element, but an m− seta of intervals with a = ym.
Example: Suppose L = ([0, 1],≤) and the t-norm is Tpr.
Then the R-implicator generated from this t-norm is given by:
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Ipr = Suptp{γ ∈ L
I |Tpr(x, γ) ≤tp y or [Tpr(x, γ)]m = ym}.
or, in other words,
Ipr = Suptp{γ ∈ L
I |(x1 × γ1 + x2 × γ2 ≤ y1 + y2) or (x1 × γ1 = y1 and
x2 × γ2 = y2)}.
Case 1: If x1 + x2 ≤ y1 + y2; Ipr = [1, 1].
Case 2: When x1 + x2 > y1 + y2, i.e. x >tp y and no interval resides
completely in the other, i.e. y1 ≤ x1 and y2 ≤ x2;
Ipr = maxtp([
y1
x1
, y2
x2
], [ y1+y2
x1+x2
, y1+y2
x1+x2
]).
Note: [ y1
x1
, y2
x2
]m − [
y1+y2
x1+x2
, y1+y2
x1+x2
]m =
(x2−x1)(y1x2−y2x1)
2x1x2(x1+x2)
.
Thus,
Ipr = [
y1
x1
, y2
x2
] if y1
y2
> x1
x2
,
= [ y1+y2
x1+x2
, y1+y2
x1+x2
] otherwise.
Case 3: When x1 + x2 > y1 + y2, i.e. x >tp y and one interval resides
completely in the other, i.e. either x1 ≤ y1 ≤ y2 < x2 or y1 < x1 ≤ x2 ≤ y2;
Ipr = [γ, γ] where, γ =
y1+y2
x1+x2
, since, [x1 × γ1, x2 × γ2]m = γ ×
x1+x2
2 = ym.
7 Modeling reasoning problems using the Preorder-
based triangle:
This section is devoted to demonstrate how the modified algebraic structure,
namely the preorder-based triangle, can be employed to model the motivat-
ing examples shown in section 3. It is also demonstrated that how the
preorder-based triangle can solve the reasoning problems mentioned before.
1. In Example 1, which presented an intuitive explanation regarding
the inadequacy of knowledge ordering, initially the experts assigned the
epistemic state [0.5, 1] to the statement ”Tweety Flies” based on incomplete
knowledge. Then when they came to know that Tweety is a penguin they
reassessed the epistemic state of ”Tweety Flies” as [0, 0]. However, since
intervals [0.5, 1] and [0, 0] are incomparable with respect to ≤k in bilattice-
based triangle it could not be decided which one is a surer assertion and
which one should be taken as the final assessment. In preorder-based triangle
this dilemma can be solved since in the newly defined knowledge ordering
we can see [0.5, 1] ≤kp [0, 0] (since (1 − 0.5) > (0 − 0)) and hence it can
be seen that interval [0, 0] is placed higher in the modified k-ordering than
[0.5, 1]. Thus the new ordering prompts to choose the definite fact ”Tweety
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doesn’t fly” (with the assigned interval [0,0]) over the default fact ”Tweety
flies” (with the assigned interval [0.5,1]).
2. Example 2 dealt with logical reasoning in a visual surveillance sys-
tem for human detection and based on the given information we tried to
reason about whether two individuals ’a’ and ’b’ were same person or not.
Performing the reasoning it was found that:
cl+(φ)(equal(a, b)) = [0.5, 0.8]
cl
−
(φ)(equal(a, b)) = [0, 0.1]
where, cl+(φ)(equal(a, b)) (cl−(φ)(equal(a, b)))accounts for the belief in
support of (against to) the fact that a and b are same person. Now to reach a
final conclusion we must consider which of the positive and negative evidence
provides with a stronger and surer belief. Hence the two epistemic states
have to be compared with respect to the knowledge ordering and we must
go with the one placed higher in knowledge ordering. But it was seen that
with the knowledge ordering in the bilattice-based triangle the two intervals
were incomparable. Though it can be seen that interval [0.5, 0.8] is wider
interval than that of [0, 0.1] and hence intuitively the later one is a more
certain assessment.
In the preorder-based triangle [0.5, 0.8] ≤kp [0, 0.1] and thus the inter-
val lubk([0.5, 0.8], [0, 0.1]) = [0, 0.1], will be taken as the final assertion of
equal(a, b).
This result can be achieved by an additional step in the reasoning:
φ[equal(a, b)] = lubk(cl+(φ)(equal(a, b)), cl−(φ)(equal(a, b))).
There is still a chance that, for two intervals lubk doesn’t exist as the
triangle structure is not complete with knowledge ordering. In that case
the indecision is justified since both the assertions give same amount of
information, i.e. the corresponding intervals are of equal length. Hence in
such a situation human intervention is necessary or some other parameter
can be used to reach to a conclusion depending on the application.
But it is to be emphasized that the modified knowledge ordering in the
preorder based triangle gives intuitive results in situations where bilattice-
based triangle fails to do so and hence the former has a wider applicability
in real life common sense reasoning.
3. In Example 3, reasoning in an artificial triage system was investigated.
It was assumed that a patient is suffering from two diseases(di1, di2), whose
drugs are mutually incompatible and the sequence of treatment could not
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be decided as the diseases have severity levels specified by intervals [0.4, 0.9]
and [0.5, 0.6] which are incomparable with respect to t-ordering of bilattice-
based triangle. The intervals being incomparable by truth ordering, rules 3
and 4, as specified in the example, become unusable.
However the modified truth ordering in preorder-based triangle can re-
solve this conflict. Firstly the rules 3 and 4 in example 3 are modified as
follows:
3’. φ[(φ[di2] ≤tp φ[di1]) −→ dr1] = [1, 1]
4’. φ[(φ[di1] ≤tp φ[di2]) −→ dr2] = [1, 1]
Now, in the current scenario Rule 3’ is invoked, inferring to administer
drug dr1, since we have [0.5, 0.6] ≤tp [0.4, 0.9]. This is intuitive; since we
have [0.5, 0.6]m = 0.55 < 0.65 = [0.4, 0.9]m and hence from Theorem ??,
Prob(ˆid1 ≤ iˆd2) ≤ Prob(ˆid2 ≤ iˆd1), i.e. though the severity degrees of the
two diseases have uncertainties but it is more probable that di1 has higher
severity than that of di2. This probabilistic intuition was not reflected in
the truth ordering of bilattice-based triangle.
Here also some situations may arise where intervals are not comparable
with respect to ≤tp , as is depicted by Figure 8. But that is also justified,
since in that case, the probability that disease di1 is more severe is equal to
the probability that disease di2 is more severe and nothing can be decided.
In these cases, depending on the application, some other parameter have to
be chosen to break the tie. Thus the modified truth ordering in the preorder-
based triangle is more intuitive and suitable for practical applications.
Therefore as a whole the aforementioned examples demonstrate that,
the inference capacity and applicability of P (L)-based reasoning systems
are broader than the bilattice-based systems.
Relationship of P (L) with existing well-known nonmonotonic
reasoning formalism:
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a well established nonmonotonic rea-
soning paradigm for commonsense reasoning in discrete domain. This rea-
soning formalism cannot deal with vague and uncertain information. Pos-
sibilistic Fuzzy Answer Set Programming (PFASP) (Bauters, Schockaert,
Janssen, Vermeir, & De Cock, 2010) is an extension of ASP for reasoning
in continuous domain in presence of uncertainties. Thus PFASP performs
nonmonontonic reasoning in presence of both vagueness and uncertainty.
In PFASP two real numbers taken from the unit interval [0, 1] are used
to specify the degree of vagueness and degree of possibility. The assignment
of the two numbers are actually independent of each other. However we can
argue that assigning two independent numbers as the degree of vagueness
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and the degree of possibility of a piece of information is not always intuitive.
Because in human commonsense reasoning our assessment of the degree of
truth of a proposition is somewhat dependent on the certainty about that
proposition.
In PFASP, there is nothing to prevent us from using a fact as:
0.5 : a←− 1,
Here, the possibility degree 0.5 signifies that the truth of a, i.e. a getting
truth value 1, is neither possible nor impossible, i.e. nothing can be said
about whether a is true or not. In other words we have no knowledge at
all about a. Thus, the facts 0.5 : a ←− 0, 0.5 : a ←− 1, 0.5 : a ←− 0.5
are all the same as the convey no information about a’s truth degree. Also,
it is unjustified to assert any truth value to a if we possess no knowledge
about the statement. Moreover the facts, 0.5 : a←− 0.6 and 0.5 : b←− 0.8
prompt to infer that b is more true than a. But the possibility degree of 0.5
for both the facts suggests that we have no knowledge about a or b; hence
comparing the truth of a and b is not even meaningful.
In this situation ascribing the interval [0, 1] to such a statement would be
more compact, straightforward and intuitive. Moreover, a range of values
comprising an interval is a more natural representation of uncertainty or
lack of unanimity of multiple experts.
Therefore the preorder-based triangle can be employed as the truth value
space or set of epistemic states in Answer Set programming to give rise to a
framework capable of performing nonmonotonic reasoning with vague and
uncertain information.
To appreciate the reasoning power of the preorder-based triangle struc-
ture we can consider an example stated in (Bauters et al., 2010) and try
to reformulate it using the proposed P (L). The example involves reasoning
about risk of roads during snow and low temperature. The rules specified
in the example are as follows:
r1: 1 : cold←− 0.6
r2: 1 : wet←− 0.4
r3: 1 : risky ←− cold.snow
r4: 0.8 : snow←− (cold ≥ 0.5) ∧ wet
r5: 0.6 : risky ←− 0.5.cold
r6: 0.6 : risky ←− 0.8.wet
Performing the reasoning, using consequence operators, the final belief
set comes to be,
S1 = {cold
1;0.6, wet1;0.4, snow0.8;0.4, risky0.6,0.32, risky0.8,0.24}
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Here, a candidate xc;t denotes truth value of x can be asserted to be t
with certainty degree c.
Remodeling using ASP based on preorder-based triangle the above rules
can be transformed into the following:
r’1: cold←− [0.6, 0.6]
r’2: wet←− [0.4, 0.4]
r’3: risky
[1,1]
← cold.snow
r’4: snow
[0.8,1]
← Tpr((cold ≥t [0.5, 0.5]), wet)
r’5: risky
[0.3,0.7]
← cold
r’6: risky
[0.6,1]
← wet
The weight of the rules are subintervals of [0, 1] and thus denotes the level
of vagueness and uncertainty level regarding the rule. In other words, the
weight denotes what would be the epistemic state of the consequent of the
rule when the antecedent is absolutely true, i.e. assigned with [1, 1]. It can
be noted that rules r1 and r2 are actually facts representing certain fuzzy
information and hence in the transformed program rules r’1 and r’2 have
exact intervals as their weights. Rules r’5 and r’6 have wider intervals as
their weights than rule r’4. This signifies that rule r’4 is a more certain rule
than r’5 or r’6. If the antecedent of a rule gets an epistemic state other than
[1, 1], say a, then the epistemic state of the consequent would be Tpr(a,w),
where w is the weight of the rule. If a particular atom is consequent of more
than one rules then the final assigned epistemic state can be obtained by
taking the least upper bound of the individual epistemic states.
Now, performing similar reasoning with the transformed rules the result-
ing belief set becomes:
S2 = {cold : [0.6, 0.6], wet : [0.4, 0.4], snow : [0.32, 0.4],
risky : lubt([0.24, 0.24], [0.18, 0.42], [0.24, 0.4])}
or, S2 = {cold : [0.6, 0.6], wet : [0.4, 0.4], snow : [0.32, 0.4], risky :
[0.24, 0.4]}.
It can be seen that the set S2 provides with range of possible values
for each atomic statement. This representation is easier to comprehend.
Therefore P (L) is suitable to be used to develop nonmonotonic reasoning
formalisms to deal with fuzzy and uncertain information.
8 Conclusion:
We conclude with a critical appreciation of the proposed structure with
respect to the bilattice-based triangle. The structure, preorder-based trian-
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gle, together with the logical operators defined on it, provides a framework
for reasoning with imprecise, uncertain and incomplete information. Unlike
bilattice-based triangle, the preorder-based triangle is capable of handling
repetitive belief revisions in nonmonotonic reasoning. Moreover the truth
ordering in the new structure is more intuitive. The fact that the knowledge
and truth order now become fully orthogonal does have a strong appeal in
application areas involving nonmonotonic logical reasoning with vague and
incomplete information. As demonstrated here, all the operators defined
for bilattice-based triangles are suitable for the proposed structure as well
and the modified truth ordering invokes some new logical connectives with
interesting properties. Thus, the proposed preorder-based structure can be
considered as an enhancement to bilattice-based triangle.
This work is an preliminary analysis of the necessity of preorder-based
triangle and its pros and cons, and leaves enough scope for further investi-
gation and analysis.
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